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Virtual private networks (VPN) are used to connect private networks of organizations securely
over public Internet. Virtual private network offers a secure and encrypted network connection
even though the underlying network is public and insecure. In addition to connecting two remote
sites with a virtual private network, it is possible to create a virtual private network between a
remote worker and an organization site. Virtual private networks allow organizations to build
secure connections relatively cheap and flexibly over the Internet.
The most widely used virtual private network protocols are IPsec (Internet Protocol Security)
and SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security) based protocols. IPsec is usually
used for connecting two remote sites and SSL/TLS based technologies are used when a remote
worker connects to the organization’s resources. Both of these protocols have held a strong po-
sition for years even though especially IPsec have been criticized since the day it was born. The
goal of this thesis was to investigate are there any alternatives available currently for IPsec and
SSL/TLS based virtual private networks and are there protocols or architectures under develop-
ment which could be alternatives in the future.
Based on the research, IPsec and SSL/TLS based protocols have superseded all older tech-
nologies and there aren’t any real alternatives available to them. Many of the network devices
manufacturers have IPsec based proprietary technologies which try to fix the issues of IPsec but
they are not compatible with the technologies and products of other manufacturers. Out of the
new protocols, Wireguard is promising and it might have a chance to challenge IPsec in the fu-
ture. Software-defined networks (SDN) and software-defined perimeter (SDP) can also challenge
traditional IPsec and SSL/TLS based virtual private networks when those solutions develop and
become more common.
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Virtuaalisia erillisverkkoja (virtual private network, VPN) käytetään yhdistämään yritysten si-
säverkkoja turvallisesti julkisen Internetin yli. Virtuaalinen erillisverkko tarjoaa turvallisen ja sala-
tun verkkoyhteyden vaikka alla oleva verkko on julkinen ja turvaton. Kahden toimipisteen yhdis-
tämisen lisäksi virtuaalinen erillisverkko voidaan muodostaa esimerkiksi työntekijän ja yrityksen
toimipisteen välille. Virtuaalisten erillisverkkojen ansiosta organisaatiot voivat rakentaa yhteyksiä
edullisesti ja joustavasti Internetin päälle.
Yleisimmät virtuaalisissa erillisverkoissa käytettävät protokollat ovat IPsec (Internet Protocol
Security) ja SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security)-pohjaiset protokollat. IP-
sec protokollaa käytetään yleensä yritysten toimipisteiden yhdistämiseen toisiinsa ja SSL/TLS-
pohjaisia tekniikoita käytetään, kun työntekijä ottaa etäyhteyden organisaation resursseihin. Mo-
lempien asema on ollut hyvin vakaa jo useita vuosia, vaikka varsinkin IPseciä on kritisoitu sen
syntymästä lähtien. Tässä diplomityössä pyrittiinkin selvittämään, onko IPsecille sekä SSL/TLS
pohjaisille virtuaalisille erillisverkoille olemassa vaihtoehtoja ja onko kehitteillä protokollia tai ark-
kitehtuureja, jotka voisivat tulevaisuudessa olla vaihtoehtoja.
Selvityksen perusteella IPsec ja SSL/TLS-pohjaiset protokollat ovat syrjäyttäneet kaikki muut
vanhemmat teknlogiat eikä niille ole ollut juurikaan vaihtoehtoja. Useilla verkkolaitevalmistajilla
on omia IPsec pohjaisia ratkaisuja, jotka pyrkivät paikkaamaan IPsecin ongelmia, mutta niiden
ongelma on yhteensopimattomuus muiden valmistajien tekniikoiden ja laitteiden kanssa. Uusista
protokollista Wireguard on kuitenkin lupaava ja sillä voi olla mahdollisuus haastaa IPsec tulevai-
suudessa. Lisäksi ohjelmisto-ohjatut verkot (software-defined networking, SDN) sekä ohjelmisto-
ohjattu ulkoreuna (software-defined perimeter, SDP) voivat tekniikan kehittyessä ja yleistyessä
haastaa perinteiset IPsec ja SSL/TLS-pohjaiset erillisverkkototeutukset.
Avainsanat: VPN, IPsec, OpenVPN
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11 INTRODUCTION
Today’s organizations are heavily utilizing networked resources and services. These ser-
vices and resources are rarely hosted in the offices or all sites, but instead they can be
hosted in own or partner’s data centers or in multiple clouds. Most of the services can’t
be publicly available in the Internet so employees need to have a secure and limited way
to access the resources from the offices and often even from home or other remote loca-
tions. To make these connections between sites and users possible and secure, virtual
private networks (VPN) were invented.
IPsec and SSL/TLS based protocols are the most widely used protocols today [93]. They
are relatively old protocols and the currently used VPN architectures which are based on
them were developed in time before cloud based services started to appear. Therefore,
they have some issues with scalability and security [26, 90].
This thesis was written to find out if there are any alternatives to the widely used IPsec
and SSL/TLS protocols. Previous research about new alternatives was not found as the
previous research has concentrated mainly on security and performance issues of IPsec
and SSL/TLS VPNs and comparing these two protocols [4, 26, 50]. Upcoming protocols
and new architecture models under development which could supersede the currently
used protocols in the future were also explored in this thesis. The thesis was made as a
literature review.
The thesis has six chapters. Chapter 2 covers the theory of IPsec and other commonly
used protocols. In Chapter 3, we explore currently available and most widely used com-
mercial and open source VPN solutions. Chapter 4 is dedicated covering the future tech-
nologies which are already available and under development. Discussion about the future
technologies and current situation is carried out in the Chapter 5 and final conclusions
are in Chapter 6.
22 VPN TUNNELS
Virtual private networks (VPN) are commonly used to interconnect private networks across
the Internet as they allow users to send and receive data securely between remote pri-
vate networks. Virtual private network connections can be built, for example, between two
remote sites of an organization (site-to-site VPN) or between user and the organization
(point-to-point VPN).
Site-to-site VPNs allow organizations to interconnect their offices over the Internet which
is less expensive and more flexible than building dedicated network connections across
long distances. When two sites are connected with VPN, computers and users in both
sites are able to securely connect to resources in private networks of the other site.
Point-to-point VPNs are usually used by users, who need to access resources securely
in their organization’s private network from outside of their organization’s network. Point-
to-point VPNs allow employees to work from homes and other remote locations so point-
to-point VPNs are widely used by all kinds of companies and organizations.
Usually, the purpose of a VPN connection is to ensure authenticity, integrity and confiden-
tiality of the network traffic. When those three things are fulfilled, the connection is private
and secure which means attackers can’t eavesdrop, tamper or spoof traffic between VPN
endpoints. How authenticity, integrity and confidentiality are achieved, depends on the
used VPN technique.
2.1 Techniques
The two most common techniques for building virtual private networks are Internet Proto-
col Security (IPsec) and Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Networks (SSL VPN). IPsec
is usually used for building site-to-site connections and SSL VPNs are often used by re-
mote users to create a point-to-point connection between their workstation and network
of their organization.
There are also other techniques like Point-to-point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) and Layer
2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) but they are not so widely used as IPsec and various SSL
VPNs.
32.2 IPsec
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a stack of protocols which is officially specified by
the Internet Engineering Task force (IETF) in several Request for Comments (RFC) doc-
uments. It is used to secure Internet Protocol (IP) communications as it can encrypt,
authenticate and checks the integrity of data packets of data streams. IPsec can be built
between two routers, between a router and a host or between two hosts and it offers
end-to-end protection for all applications as it operates on third level of OSI model.
Development of IPsec started originally in the early years of the 1990s, some time after
the development of IPv6 was started. Development of IPv6 allowed IETF to define and
integrate several security improvements to new versions of IP-protocol and so IPsec was
defined as a part of IPv6 in RFC 1883. RFC 1883 only defines the requirements of
IPsec as the protocols of the stack are defined in other RFCs [20]. Original RFC which
defined the protocols of IPsec were RFC 1825-1829, which were published 1995 [8].
They have been superseded two times with newer versions and current, most essential
ones, RFCs are 4301-4309 [49]. Originally, IPsec was developed for IPv6 but as it wasn’t
ready and widely used, IPsec was also developed for IPv4 and was widely deployed to
IPv4 networks.
Like it was earlier said, IPsec is a protocol stack or framework which offers multiple ser-
vices, algorithms and granularities. It offers services for data integrity, data origin authen-
tication, confidentiality and protection against replay attacks [49]. That means user can
select to use only those services which they need in their situation.
IPsec has multiple available algorithms as it was designed to be algorithm-independent
because currently secure algorithms might not be secure forever and they may need to
be changed to new ones. This has kept IPsec usable even though some of the algorithms
it has used have been found out to be insecure [96].
Multiple granularities mean that users can create various configurations for tunnels de-
pending on their needs. For example, users can have a tunnel which secures all traffic
between two routers or all traffic between to hosts or have a separate encrypted tunnel
for each TCP connection between two hosts [96].
IPsec can operate in two modes, transport and tunnel mode. The transport mode only
encrypts the payload of IP packet as IPsec header is inserted after IP header. The
transport mode can be used for connections between two hosts or between host and
a gateway, so it is usually used for client-to-site IPsec VPN connections. If Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) header is used, IPsec in transport mode can be used together
with another tunneling protocol like Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) or L2TP. If it
used with GRE or L2TP, another protocol encapsulates the IP data packet and IPsec is
used to protect these encapsulated packets [107].
In tunnel mode IPsec protects the entire IP packet as it encapsulates the original packet
in the payload of a new IP packet. As the entire IP packet is encapsulated and original
4source and destination addresses are hidden, tunnel mode hides the internal routing
information.
The tunnel mode is usually used between two routers for interconnecting private networks
securely over a public network [107]. Hosts in private networks don’t need to be aware of
IPsec as it is terminated in routers. That simplifies configuration as tunnel only has to be
configured in routers. Compared to the transport mode and a connection without IPsec,
tunnel mode increases packet size significantly as it adds an additional IP header.
2.2.1 AH and ESP headers
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) headers offer
services for data integrity, data origin authentication, anti-replay attack and confidentiality.
 The IP Authentication Header ensures data integrity and data origin authentication,
and it also offers optional anti-replay attack features [47].
 The Encapsulating Security Payload ensures data integrity and data origin authen-
tication like AH and has anti-replay attack features, but also ensures confidentiality
if user wants so [49].
AH and ESP may be used individually or together but using only ESP is the most common
practice as most security requirements can be fulfilled with it. Both protocols support
transport and tunnel modes.
The concept of Authentication Header is derived from SNMPv2 Security Protocol, which
was defined in RFC 1446, and AH was originally defined in RFC 1826 [7, 30]. In IPv4 AH
is inserted between IP header and Transport Control Protocol (TCP) header. In IPv6 AH
is one of the extension headers. The format of an authentication header is displayed in
the figure 2.1
Figure 2.1. Authentication Header
 The Next Header of the authentication header is 8 bits wide and it contains the
IP Protocol number of the original IP packet, because the protocol number of the
original IP packet was replaced with 51 to indicate that authentication header follows
it [47].
 The Payload length is 8 bits wide and it defines the length of authentication data
[47].
 The Reserved field is reserved for future use, so currently it must be all zeros [47].
5 The Security Parameters Index (SPI) is 32 bit field which contains pseudo-random
value which is used to identify the security association of the datagram [47].
 The Sequence Number is a 32 bits wide field which contains a counter value. Value
is increased by one for each sent packet. The counter is used for preventing replay
attacks. This field is mandatory, even though replay attack protection is an optional
service, so the sender must always include it in the packet. If the receiver doesn’t
want to use replay-attack protection, they can ignore the field. [47]
 The Integrity Check Value (ICV) field’s length varies but it always contains a digital
signature of the payload. The Security Association between the sender and the
receiver defines the field’s size and signature algorithm [47]. IPsec is based on
symmetric cryptography, so sender and receiver have a shared key which is used
for computing the signature.
The authentication header doesn’t support encryption so it is useful only if data integrity
is required but encryption is not needed. In addition to the payload, AH also checks the
integrity of some other fields, including source address. Therefore, it ensures the origin
of the data as attacker can’t spoof the source address.
The ESP header is more commonly used than AH because it also offers encryption.
Originally, AH offered only integrity checks like today and ESP only offered encryption, so
they were used together. Later, ESP was developed and integrity checks were added to
it which made AH obsolete [96].
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show where the ESP header is located in transport and tunnel modes.
Instead of doing integrity checks in ESP header, they are done with an additional field
which comes after the payload, like shown in the figures 2.2 and 2.3.
Figure 2.2. ESP in transport mode
Figure 2.3. ESP in tunnel mode
The ESP header consists of two 32-bit words, which are Security Parameters Index and
Sequence number. Both fields were also used in the AH header and they have an identi-
cal role as with AH: SPI contains a pseudo-random number which is used for identifying
the security association of the datagram and sequence number field contains a counter
that is increased for each sent packet to prevent replay attacks. ESP payload format is
displayed in the figure 2.4.
6Figure 2.4. ESP format
After the ESP header, an ESP packet consists of the following fields:
 The Payload data field which starts with Initialization Vector (IV) for a cryptographic
algorithm and continues with the contents of the original IP packet. If tunnel mode
is used, there can also be Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) padding at the end of
the payload field. [48]
 The Padding field is 8 bits wide and it is used to extend the payload size to size that
matches the cipher block size of the encryption. Length varies from 0 to 255 octets
[48].
 The Pad Length is 8 bits wide and contains the length of padding in octets.
 The Next Header is 8 bits wide and it contains the IP Protocol number of the original
IP packet [48].
 Integrity Check Value is a field with variable length which is computed from the
ESP header, Payload and ESP trailer fields. This field is optional as it is only used
if integrity service is enabled. Security Association between sender and receiver
defines the field’s size and signature algorithm. [48]
It is possible to use ESP in a authentication-only or encryption-only configuration but
using encryption without authentication is not recommended as it is insecure [21, 72].
Using ESP in transport mode is less secure than using it in tunnel mode, as ESP in
transport mode doesn’t authenticate the original IP header, like the figure 2.2 shows.
2.2.2 ESP authentication and encryption algorithms
ESP can use various algorithms for encryption and authentication as protocol suite and
ESP standard are independent of the cryptography algorithm [48, 49]. The supported and
required algorithms of ESP and AH are listed in separate RFC, which have been updated
a couple of times after it original release [1, 56, 59]. The current list of deprecated,
required and recommended algorithms can be found in RFC 7321 [59].
Manufacturers tend to follow IPsec standard, so devices and applications have many
7different encryption and authentication algorithms available, so used algorithms are se-
lected by user depending which algorithms are supported by tunnel endpoints and what
are the requirements for security. As IP packets may arrive out of order and some pack-
ets may get lost, ESP standard says "each packet must carry any data required to allow
the receiver to establish cryptographic synchronization for decryption" [48]. That data is
usually carried in the payload field as Initialization Vector.
Currently, IPsec standard supports null, AES-CBC, AES-CTR and TripleDES-CBC algo-
rithms for encryption, HMAC-SHA1-96, AES-GMAC with AES-128, AES-XCBC-MAC-96
and null algorithms for message authentication codes (MAC) and AES-GCM and AES-
CCM for providing authentication and encryption in combined mode [59]. The old DES-
CBC algorithm has been deprecated and current implementations of IPsec should not
support it anymore as it has too short key and block size and therefore it is considered
insecure [59]. TripleDES also has too small block size but it is still supported for back-
ward compatibility and usage of it is discouraged [59]. Null algorithms are used, if either
authentication or encryption is not required.
All currently recommended encryption and combined operation algorithms of IPsec use
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher because it was selected by National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) as the standard for the encryption of electronic data.
It replaced the old Data Encryption Standard (DES) which is currently considered as
insecure.
AES-CBC mode uses Advanced Encryption standard Cipher in Cipher Block Chaining
mode with an Initialization Vector. IV must be as long as the block size. AES-CBC mode
supports 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit keys, but only 128 bit keys are mandatory for the
IPsec standard [29]. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 shows how CBC mode encrypts and decrypts
data.
Figure 2.5. CBC mode encryption
8Figure 2.6. CBC mode decryption
The CBC mode is the oldest and most commonly used block cipher operation mode. In
RFC 7321, it is the only encryption algorithm which is mandatory for IPsec implementa-
tion [59]. The main drawbacks of CBC-mode are that encryption cannot be parallelized
and that messages must be padded to a multiple of cipher block size. Lack of paralleliz-
ing hurts the performance which can be an issue with IPsec tunnels if high throughput is
required from a tunnel.
AES-CTR mode uses AES cipher in Counter mode, which turns a block cipher into a
stream cipher. CTR mode requires a counter value which consists of a nonce, an Ini-
tialization Vector and a counter block. Nonce is a single use value which is assigned
at the beginning of security association, Initialization Vector is a unique value generated
by sender for each used key and block counter is a value which is increased after each
packet to generate next parts of the key stream. [37]
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate how CTR mode encryption works. Decryption is the same
as encryption, but backwards, so separate decryption implementation is not required.
9Figure 2.7. CTR mode encryption
Figure 2.8. CTR mode decryption
Compared to the CBC mode, the CTR mode can be faster as the encryption process can
be parallelized and the sender can precompute the key stream which makes it suitable
for high-speed networking [55]. Another advantage of CTR mode is that it doesn’t require
padding. The disadvantage of CTR mode is that it is easily misused: if Initialization Vector
is used for more than one packet with the same key, the confidentiality can no longer be
guaranteed [37]. The CTR mode must not be used without authentication as it is easy
construct a forged ciphertext from a valid ciphertext [37].
The CTR mode would perform great with IPsec tunnels if it wouldn’t require a separate
authentication algorithm. CTRmode itself is parallelizable and therefore fast, but available
authentication algorithms are not fast enough for high data rates [100].
The above mentioned CBC and CTR modes are encryption only algorithms and therefore
they should always be used together with authentication algorithms which IPsec offers
[59]. If either AES in Counter with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM) mode or AES in Galois/Counter
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(AES-GCM) mode is used in combined mode, a separate authentication algorithm is not
required as these algorithms can also authenticate the packets [38, 100].
AES-CCM mode uses AES cipher in Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Au-
thentication code mode [38]. AES-CCM is a stream cipher like AES-CTR, but before
encryption it first computes authentication value with CBC-MAC and then encrypts the
payload with AES in Counter mode [108]. Performance is about the same as with CBC
mode [108].
AES-GCM uses AES in Galois/Counter mode. Like CCMmode, it is based on CTRmode,
but instead of using CBC-MAC, it uses a binary Galois field to provide authentication [58].
The advantage of AES-GCM is that it combines the fast CTR mode with an authentication
mechanism which can be parallelized [100]. Therefore, AES-GCM is the fastest mode for
IPsec encryption and authentication.
Figure 2.9 illustrates how GCM-mode works. EK denotes the used block cipher using
the key K, multH denotes multiplication by the hash key H and incr denotes counter
increment function [58].
Figure 2.9. AES-GCM encryption
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Because the GCM mode is based on the CTR mode, it shares the same security issues,
so the combination of a key and an IV must not be used more than once. Therefore all
AES-GCM implementations for IPsec must use automated key management [100].
2.2.3 Security Associations
Security Association (SA) is a logical simplex connection between IPsec endpoints which
has to be established before endpoints can exchange any data over IPsec. If both end-
points want to send and receive data, they need two Security Associations as connections
are simplex. [49]
Security Associations contain the security parameters which are required for sending and
receiving packets to the other endpoint. SA contains the following data:
 Security Parameter Index (SPI) which is used to identify the SA
 The Source and destination addresses of the SA
 Used encryption algorithm and mode
 Encryption key
 Used authentication algorithm
 Authentication key
 Additional attributes like SA lifetime
Information about Security Associations is stored stored in Security Association Database
(SAD) [49]. When IPsec sends data to another endpoint, it first consults Security Policy
Database (SPD) and according to the first matching SPD rule, the packet is either dis-
carded, sent without IPsec protection or sent to SA found in the SPD rule [49]. When
packets are sent to SA, they are then authenticated and encrypted with parameters de-
fined by SA [49, 51]. If SA doesn’t exist, IKE process to create SA is started.
Incoming packets are matched to correct SA in SAD using a combination of SPI, source
address and destination. When matching SA is found, packets are authenticated and
decrypted with parameters found in SA [49].
2.2.4 Security association and key management
Security Associations can be configured manually but that is not recommended as it
makes management of multiple IPsec tunnels difficult. The most serious issue with a
manual configuration is that secret keys of Security Associations should be used only for
a limited time and if the configuration has been done manually, the secret key has to be
changed manually. To solve issues with manual configuration of Security Associations,
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IPsec supports Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol which allows dynamic configuration
of Security Associations [46].
The latest and currently recommended version of IKE is the version 2 (IKEv2). First
version of IKE (IKEv1) was described in RFC 2409 in 1998 and it was replaced with
IKEv2 which was described in RFC 4306. IKEv2 has been updated a couple of times
and the current version is defined in RFC 7296 [46]. IKEv1 is still widely supported by
networking devices and software but using it is not recommended as it has several flaws
[73].
All IKE communication always consists of requests and responses to them and these two
messages form an exchange. If requester doesn’t get response within specified timeout,
it should resend the request or discard the connection completely. [46]
The IKE process starts with IKE_SA_INT exchange. During the first exchange, partici-
pants negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, execute Diffie-Hellman ex-
change and open IKE Security Association (IKE SA) which is a secure and bi-directional
communication channel between endpoints. That channel is used in IKE phase 2. [46]
IKE_SA_INT exchange has either 2 or 4 messages. In the basic operation mode, only
two messages are required but that leaves protocol open for spoofing attacks [41]. To
protect against spoofing, IKEv2 can use additional 2 messages for cookies during the
IKE_SA_INT exchange. Figure 2.10 displays the course of the exchange with cookie
challenge.
Abbreviations used in the figures 2.10 and 2.11 are described below:
 AUTH denotes authentication date of the sent message
 CERT denotes optional certificate
 CERTREQ optional certificate request
 HDR denotes IKE header
 IDi denotes identification of initiator
 IDr denotes identification of responder
 KEi denotes Diffie-Hellman key exchange value of initiator
 KEr denotes Diffie-Hellman key exchange value of responder
 Ni,Nr denotes nonce
 SAi1 denotes payload containing cryptographic algorithms supported by initiator
 SAr1 denotes payload containing the selected cryptography algorithms
 SAi2 denotes payload containing data of offered SA
 SAr2 denotes payload containing accepted offer
 TSi denotes Traffic Selector of initiator
 TSr denotes Traffic Selector of responder
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Cookies are used if a certain threshold of incomplete sessions is reached and the respon-
der decides to generate a cookie and send it to the initiator. The initiator must attach the
cookie to the original message to prove the original message wasn’t spoofed. When the
responder receives the request with a valid cookie, it replies to the initiator and completes
the exchange.
Figure 2.10. IKE_SA_INT exchange with cookie challenge
The process continues with IKE_AUTH exchange. All messages of the exchange are
sent over the secure IKE SA which was created after IKE_SA_INT exchange. During
the IKE_SA exchange both sides of the connection reveal their identities to authenticate
themselves, negotiate the encryption and authentication algorithms and establish encryp-
tion and authentication keys [46]. Exchange is illustrated in the figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11. IKE_AUTH exchange
TSi and TSr payloads are used transmit Traffic Selector (TS) payloads from endpoint to
other. TS payloads allow endpoints to communicate some information from their SPD
to each other. TS payloads specify which packets are forwarded to which SA. In some
scenarios, this can be used to check consistency between SPDs and in other scenarios
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these payloads can be used to dynamically update SPDs. [46]
TSi payload specifies the source addresses and TSr payload specifies the destination
addresses of traffic which is forwarded to the SA from the initiator. If the responder
accepts the proposal of the initiator, it sends identical TSi and TSr payloads back to the
initiator [46]. If responder doesn’t have identical Traffic Selectors, it can narrow them to a
subset of the proposal:
 If the responder doesn’t accept any part of the proposed Traffic Selectors, it re-
sponds with TS_UNACCEPTABLE notify message [46].
 If the responder accepts the entire TSi and TSr, narrowing the proposal is not re-
quired and the responder can reply with identical TSi and TSr values [46].
 If the responder accepts the first selector of TSi and TSr, then responder narrows
the Traffic Selectors to a subset that includes the initiator’s proposal. For exam-
ple, if proposed TSi contained subnet 192.168.1.0/24 and TSr contained subnet
192.168.2.0/24, responder can respond identical TSi and with TSr set to 0.0.0.0/0.
[46]
 If the responder do doesn’t accept the first selector of TSi and TSr, it narrows them
to an acceptable subset [46]
After IKE_AUTH exchange is completed successfully, a pair of simplex IPsec SAs is
created. These Security Associations are also called child SAs. [46]
In addition to IKE_INT and IKE_AUTH exchanges, IKE has CREATE_CHILD_SA and IN-
FORMATIONAL exchanges. CREATE_CHILD_SA is used when new child SA is needed
or one of the existing child SAs needs to be re-keyed. Re-keying is used because en-
cryption keys should be used only for a limited time. Re-keying creates a new child SA
with new keys, moves traffic to new child SA and finally deletes the old child SA with IN-
FORMATIONAL exchange. Usage of re-keying process instead of deleting and creating
a new SA prevents the breaks of the IPsec connection. [46]
INFORMATIONAL exchanges can have three kinds of payloads: Delete payload is used
for deleting child SAs, Notify payload can carry error and status information and Configu-
ration payload is used for exchanging configuration between peers [46].
2.3 SSL VPN
There isn’t any single standard defining SSL VPNs. Instead of a single standard, several
software and networking equipment companies have their own products which all create
SSL VPN tunnels. Lack of single standard means that products of different vendors are
not usually compatible with each other. Even though there isn’t any single standard for
SSL VPNs, they all use Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS superseded the
original Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol [22], but SSL acronym is still used with SSL
VPNs.
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2.3.1 TLS protocol
TLS protocol is widely used for securing TCP traffic. The predecessor, SSL, was originally
designed by Netscape engineers and it was first used to protect traffic between web
servers and web browsers [51]. Later the usage of it has spread to other purposes, like
SSL VPNs, because SSL/TLS protocol can be used to protect any kind of traffic that uses
TCP [51]. SSL/TLS offers encryption using symmetric cryptography, authentication using
public-key cryptography and integrity for the traffic using message authentication code
[22] so it fulfills the basic requirements of a VPN.
The TLS protocol consists of four steps: handshake and the cipher suite negotiation, au-
thentication of parties, key-related information exchange and application data exchange
[99]. First three of those steps are handled by TLS Handshake Protocol and application
data exchange is handled by TLS Record Protocol [99].
A TLS handshake starts when a client sends Client Hello message to the server. A Client
Hello message contains protocol version, a client random, a session ID, supported cipher
suites and supported compression methods. The server tries to find an acceptable set of
algorithms from the Client Hello message and if it success, it will reply with Server Hello
message. Server hello message contains protocol version, a server random, a session
ID, the selected cipher suite and the selected compression method. [22].
After the server has sent a hello message, it sends the server certificate in Certificate
message. If the server doesn’t have a certificate, it sends a Server Key Exchange mes-
sage to the client. Additionally, the server can request a certificate from the client. After
these messages, the server sends a Server Hello Done message which indicates first
part of the handshake is complete and waits reply from the client. [22].
If the server requested a certificate from the client, the client sends a certificate to the
server. Immediately after the client has sent a certificate, it sends a Client Key Exchange
message which contains an encrypted premaster secret or Diffie-Hellman parameters for
agreeing upon the same premaster secret. If the client certificate has signing capability,
it sends a signed Certificate Verify message to the server. [22].
When the both client and server have the premaster secret, they use both use the same
key derivation function to compute master secret (MS) from the premaster secret and
random values which were part of the hello messages. Master secret is divided into
two encryption and two MAC keys: one encryption and MAC key for the client and one
encryption and MAC key for the server [22].
After the client has computed the encryption and MAC keys and has sent the certificate
and the subsequent messages, it continues with a Change Cipher Spec message. When
the message has been sent, it starts to use the agreed cipher suite and computed keys
and sends a Finished message encrypted with the selected algorithm and key. Server
replies to these messages with its own Change Cipher Spec message and finishes hand-
shake process by sending Finished message encrypted with the selected algorithm and
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key. [22].
When the handshake has been completed successfully, the client and the server can start
sending application data via secure message channel. The message flow of handshake
process is illustrated in the figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12. TLS Handshake message flow
Securing the application data is the responsibility of the record protocol [99]. Even though
TLS runs over TCP and TCP is a byte stream protocol, TLS doesn’t encrypt and send data
as a data stream because including MAC in a stream wouldn’t be possible [51]. Therefore,
the TLS record protocol, which is responsible for securing the application data, splits data
into manageable blocks, compresses the data if required, applies MAC to the data block,
encrypts it and then passes it to TCP for transmit [22]. In the receiving end, record
protocol decrypts data block, verifies the integrity and origin of the data, decompresses
and reassembles it and finally passes it to the application which is using TLS [22].
2.3.2 SSL VPN Architecture
SSL VPNs usually support two different operating modes: portal and tunnel mode [90,
91, 92]. In portal mode, users connect to a web portal with a web browser and after
login, they can access services through the portal page. Using the portal mode is easy
for users as they only need a web browser which supports TLS and credentials, but the
portal mode has its limitations: users can only access services and resources via the
VPN portal with browser and all other traffic is routed towards public Internet [90, 91].
The tunnel mode is the other operating mode for SSL VPNs and it usually requires a client
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software to the user’s workstation. A client software or a web browser connects to the
VPN endpoint, authenticates the user and creates a TLS tunnel between workstation and
the VPN endpoint. Users can be authenticated with combination of X.509 certificates,
username, password and one-time-password [6, 18, 31]. Depending on the configuration
all network traffic can be routed through the VPN tunnel or just the traffic which destination
is in the intranet of the organization. The advantage of the tunnel mode is that it allows
users to use all kinds of applications to access resources and services in the intranet of
the organization. If all traffic is routed to the tunnel, organization can monitor and protect
their VPN users with organization firewalls and other security appliances.
2.4 PPTP
Point-to-point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) is a protocol for tunneling PPP packets over IP
networks developed in the 1990s by several companies, including Microsoft and 3Com.
It was designed to be used as a VPN protocol and it was widely used before it was found
to be insecure. Protocol is defined in RFC 2637, but it has not been ratified by IETF as a
standard [35].
PPTP uses TCP control channel and GRE tunnel to encapsulate the PPP packets. Traffic
is first encapsulated to PPP packets, then those packets are encapsulated with GRE and
those are sent over IP network to the VPN endpoint which extracts the original payload
from the encapsulated packets. Every GRE tunnel has a separate TCP control channel,
which is used for the establishment, management and release of the connection. [35]
PPTP specification doesn’t define any authentication or encryption methods as it relies
on Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) on these things. PPP neither defines any algorithms
for authentication or encryption, but it offers a framework for negotiating them [60, 76,
81]. Most of the algorithms which are used by PPTP have been developed by Microsoft
as they were part of the PPTP development consortium and most of the commercial
PPTP solutions have been published and distributed by Microsoft. All Microsoft Windows
versions have supported PPTP since Windows 95.
It was already found in 1998 that Microsoft’s authentication protocol Microsoft Chal-
lenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (MSCHAP) and RC4 based encryption protocol
(MPPE) are weak and easy to crack [78].
After issues were found in MSCHAP and MPPE, Microsoft released MSCHAP v2 and
updated MPPE protocol to use different keys to each direction [79]. Changes fixed the
most critical security flaws found found earlier from the protocols, but like Schneider and
Mudge mentioned in their analysis, the fundamental flaw of the authentication and en-
cryption algorithms is that they are only as strong as user’s password [79].
In 2012, it was demonstrated that brute-force cracking of MSCHAP v2 key is as simple
as cracking a DES key and it will take only 23 hours to crack it with an online service [57].
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Computing power has increased since that so cracking MSCHAP v2 is even faster today
and therefore PPTP should be used no more as all traffic can be decrypted relatively
easy. However, it is still probably used in some older environments and some public VPN
providers still support it.
Above mentioned security flaws are not flaws of the PPP and PPTP protocols itself as
they are only issues of Microsoft protocols. Microsoft protocols are practically only au-
thentication and encryption protocols for PPTP which are widely supported by operating
systems and networking devices, so there aren’t any alternatives to them and therefore
there are no options to make PPTP secure.
2.5 L2TP
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is a protocol for tunneling and transmitting datagrams
of L2 protocols over various networks like IP and ATM [66]. Basic concept is quite similar
to PPTP and it uses PPP like PPTP [66]. The latest version L2TPv3 also supports other
L2 protocols than PPP like Ethernet and Frame Relay [53]. Like PPTP, L2TP doesn’t
provide any confidentiality or encryption by itself. Structure of L2TP packet containing an
IP datagram is shown in picture 2.13.
Figure 2.13. L2TP packet containing an IP datagram
As L2TP uses PPP, it inherits the PPP authentication, encryption and compression pro-
tocols, but they don’t fulfill the security requirements: PPP authentication doesn’t provide
per packet authentication, integrity or replay protection and PPP encryption doesn’t offer
authentication, integrity checks or replay protection. Therefore, RFC 3193 proposes that
IPSec suite should be used for protecting L2TP traffic in IP networks. [71]
The combination of L2TP and IPsec is often called L2TP/IPsec. It works as plain IPsec
but instead of encapsulating IP Datagrams, it encapsulates L2TP datagrams which con-
tains the payload. Structure of encapsulated L2TP datagram is shown in picture 2.14.
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Figure 2.14. L2TP datagram encrypted with IPsec
Compared to plain IPsec, L2TP/IPsec has more overhead as L2TP encapsulation adds
additional headers to the encapsulated datagram so performance can be worse than with
plain IPsec. The main reason to use L2TP/IPsec is that it allows transmitting L2 traffic
over IPsec tunnel which plain IPsec doesn’t allow.
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3 VPN SOLUTIONS
3.1 Commercial solutions
Several networking equipment and software vendors offer products which allow organi-
zations to build site-to-site and client VPNs for their users. All of the client VPN products
support SSL/TLS encryption and some of them also support IPsec. For site-to-site VPNs,
IPsec is the most widely supported and used technology.
Even though all commercial client VPN solutions support SSL/TLS and some cases
IPsec, they are incompatible with the products of other vendors as everyone has their
own software for their VPN. That means organizations are locked to the server and client
software of a single vendor. Therefore, organizations must consider the pros and cons of
both server and client software before choosing a solution.
Basic site-to-site IPsec solutions should be compatible between all vendors as IPsec
is a standard but some vendors might have features which others don’t support and
some configuration sets can be incompatible with some devices or software versions.
Some vendors also have their own proprietary site-to-site VPN solutions which are only
supported by their devices.
3.1.1 Cisco
Cisco Systems, Inc. is the largest networking company in the world. They develop, man-
ufacture and sell all kinds of networking hardware, software and services to enterprises.
Cisco currently has six different VPN solutions in their portfolio:
 Dynamic Multipoint VPN (DMVPN) is dual-stacked (IPv4/IPv6) solution which uses
multipoint Generic Routing Encapsulation (mGRE) and IKEv1 or IKEv2 for building
scalable IPsec networks. DMVPN has a centralized architecture so all tunnels have
the same endpoint in the central hub and according to Cisco, connecting new sites
to the central location should be simple as the hub doesn’t require any changes to
the configuration.
 FlexVPN is an IPsec based solution which aims to simplify the deployment of VPNs
for remote access, site-to-site and other scenarios. It can be considered as a de-
veloped version of DMVPN as it supports the same features and configuration is
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simplified compared to the DMVPN.
 Group Encrypted Transport VPN (GETVPN) is a VPN solution which allow encrypt-
ing MPLS and IP WANs without losing any-to-any connectivity and simplifies en-
cryption management through the use of group keying instead of point-to-point key
pairs.
 SSLVPN is a VPN solution for remote access which uses TLS or Datagram Trans-
port Layer Security (DTLS) for encrypting the data.
 Easy VPN is Cisco’s proprietary solution based on IPsec which aims to simplify
VPN deployments for remote sites and mobile workers.
 Standard IPsec and Static IPsec are terms of Cisco for standard site-to-site IPsec
connection between two locations.
DMVPN is Cisco’s proprietary solution to building GRE over IPsec tunnels in dynamic
and scalable manner. It relies on two relatively old technologies: Next Hop Resolution
Protocol (NHRP) and mGRE. [14]
Multipoint GRE simplifies the tunnel configuration significantly as it allows single GRE
interface to support multiple tunnels. As only one interface is required to the central hub,
the amount of configuration in smaller than when using one GRE interface per tunnel [14].
NHRP allows systems connected to Non-Broadcast Multi-Access (NBMA) network to
learn the physical NBMA address of the other systems that are part of the network, allow-
ing them to directly communicate with each other. NHRP utilizes Next Hop Server (NHS)
which is the central hub for communication. Other nodes of the network are spokes for
it and they act as Next Hop Clients (NHC). The NHS maintains a NHRP database of the
public interface addresses of each spoke and when a spoke wants to connect to other
spoke, it queries NHS for the address of the other spoke. [13]
DMVPN provides full or partial meshed connectivity between the hub and spokes. Only
the hub requires static IP addresses and adding new spokes doesn’t require any changes
to the hub as multipoint GRE can handle new tunnels from new spokes automatically.
Hub-to-spoke tunnels are static but DMVPN can also dynamically create direct tunnels
from spoke-to-spoke. [14]
Hub-and-spoke configuration, which is displayed in the figure 3.1, is the simplest setup
for DMVPN. All traffic between spokes goes through the hub and every spoke requires
their own tunnel. Tunnels between spokes and the hub are static but compared to using
normal GRE over IPsec tunnels, configuration is simpler as adding new spokes doesn’t
require any additional configuration to hub. [14]
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Figure 3.1. Hub-and-spoke configuration
In a spoke-to-spoke configuration, which is shown in the figure 3.2, tunnels between
spokes and hub are static tunnels like in the hub-to-spoke configuration. Tunnels between
spokes are created dynamically when spokes need to communicate with each other.
When spoke needs to connect to another spoke, it queries the NHS on the hub and
requests the NHRP mapping from the NHS. Source spoke gets the NHRP mapping,
which tells the public interface address of the destination spoke, from the NHS and with
the help of that mapping it can create a direct tunnel to the destination spoke dynamically.
[14]
Using dynamic tunnels between spokes reduces latency and load on the hub as unicast
traffic between the spokes don’t need to go through the hub. However, multicast and
control traffic is still sent through the hub. [14]
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Figure 3.2. Spoke-to-spoke configuration
Cisco also offers solution called FlexVPN which is in practice a more developed version
of DMVPN. It supports site-to-site, hub-to-spoke and spoke-to-spoke tunnels like DMVPN
and in addition to those, FlexVPN also supports remote-access setups for teleworkers.
Both are based on the same basic technologies: IPsec, GRE and NHRP. There are still
some major differences between the two solutions.
FlexVPN uses multiple static and dynamic GRE interfaces instead of one static mGRE
interface which DMVPN uses. Usage of multiple GRE interfaces instead of one mGRE in-
terface gives better control over each hub-to-spoke connection and therefore allows more
customized configurations for each connection and more flexible QoS options. Interfaces
are static for hub-to-spoke connections and dynamic for spoke-to-spoke connections. Dy-
namic interfaces are cloned from a virtual-template interface.
In FlexVPN, spokes don’t register to the hub like in DMVPN as NHRP is only used to es-
tablish spoke-to-spoke connections. As NHRP is not used for hub-to-spoke registration,
routing information needs to be advertised via other mechanisms. FlexVPN supports
IKEv2, so routing information can be inserted into IKEv2 SAs for route advertising or
dynamic routing protocols like BGP can be used to advertise routes.
Another alternative to the DMVPN and FlexVPN is Cisco’s GETVPN. It is completely
different compared to all other VPN solutions in Cisco’s portfolio as it tunnel-less VPN
solution which is based on Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) and IPsec. Compared
to DMVPN and traditional IPsec tunnels, GET VPN is more scalable as point-to-point
tunnels are not required, it supports native routing and multicast works without any issues.
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The key technology behind GETVPN is GDOI. GDOI is a protocol defined in RFC 3547
which handles management of cryptographic keys and policies for the devices participat-
ing in GET VPN infrastructure.
All VPN endpoints, which are called Group Members (GM) in GET VPN, are part of a
trusted group which shares a group security association (group SA). As SA is shared,
all of the group members share the same encryption keys and parameters and therefore
all GMs can decrypt the messages of other GMs of the group. Shared SA allows GMs
to communicate with each other without point-to-point tunnels and this makes GET VPN
scalable.
Figure 3.3. GETVPN architecture
Initialization of shared SA starts when all GMs authenticate themselves with the Key
server (KS) using IKE Phase 1 with either PSK or PKI. After GM has authenticated, it
downloads the encryption policies and keys of the shared SA from the KS. Periodically
KS pushes new keys and pseudotime to all GMs. Keys are used for encrypting the traffic
and pseudotime is used for replay protection: all sent packets contain a timestamp of
pseudotime and receiver compares the timestamp to the pseudotime it has. If a packet
arrives too late, it is dropped.
In addition to using shared SA, GET VPN preserves the tunnel header. In traditional
IPSec setups tunnel endpoint addresses are used as the source and the destination of
the encrypted packet. In GETVPN, the original source and destination addresses are
encapsulated to an outer header which allows packets to be routed using the underlying
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network infrastructure. The preservation of tunnel header makes GETVPN to be very
well suited for MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching), layer 2 (L2) and IP networks with
end to end IP connectivity as packets can be routed in the network natively.
Cisco markets Easy VPN as a solution for easier site-to-site VPN deployments which
also supports remote-access setups for teleworkers [15]. However, Cisco has already
stopped developing and supporting their remote-access client software [24] as they are
concentrating on their AnyConnect VPN client which supports SSLVPN and IKEv2 IPsec
but doesn’t support Easy VPN as Easy VPN is limited to IKEv1. Therefore, users need
to use 3rd party clients like Shrew [80] or TheGreenBow [98] if they want to keep using
Easy VPN as remote-access solution.
As support for remote-access usage is limited, Easy VPNs real benefits are easier de-
ployment and management compared to traditional point-to-point IPsec tunnels and sup-
port of hub-to-spoke architectures. Easy VPN uses Cisco Unity framework to which is
their proprietary mechanism for defining and relaying IPsec parameters. Client device
initiates a connection to an Easy VPN server and provides authentication credentials.
The Easy VPN server, which is a hub in the architecture, then checks the provided cre-
dentials and pushes IPsec configuration to the client device. IPsec configuration is iden-
tical to all clients/spokes which makes management easier and centralized. Tunnels can
be built automatically, manually or by traffic triggers, which means a tunnel is built when
something tries to send traffic to the destination.
The primary offering from Cisco to remote access VPN solution market today is their
proprietary AnyConnect. AnyConnect itself is the client software which is available for all
major operating systems and mobile devices and VPN tunnels used by AnyConnect can
be terminated with most of the modern Cisco enterprise routers and firewalls. Tunnels
can either be SSL tunnels (TLS 1.2 and DTLS) or IPsec IKEv2 tunnels:
 DTLS is optimized for traffic requiring low latency, such as VoIP traffic.
 IPsec IKEv2 can be used when low latency is required and IPsec is required by
security policies. [12]
3.1.2 Juniper
Juniper Networks, Inc. is an American networking and cybersecurity company, which de-
velops and sells networking hardware and software and cybersecurity solutions. Juniper
doesn’t have SSL VPN in their offering any longer as they moved their Junos Pulse soft-
ware and products to Pulse Secure in 2015 [45], but they offer IPsec based remote access
VPN solution together with NCP engineering GmbH [77]. For site-to-site use cases, their
routers and firewalls support IPsec and three proprietary VPN solutions called AutoVPN,
Auto Discovery VPN (ADVPN) and Group VPN [9, 33].
AutoVPN is a hub-and-spoke, IPsec based solution which, like Cisco’s DMPVN, consists
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of a central hub and multiple spokes. Advantage compared to basic site-to-site IPsec
tunnel is that additional spokes can be added to the network without making any changes
to the hub. Routing and IPsec related settings are only managed in the hub. These two
things make the initial deployment and later the management easier. [42]
The underlying technology in AutoVPN is called next-hop tunnel binding (NHTB) [42].
NHTB allows multiple IPsec tunnels to be bound on the same logical tunnel interface,
which simplifies the configuration as only a single interface is required in the hub [39].
Routing decisions are made based on the NHTB table, which maps destination IP pre-
fixes to the next hop address which is the address of the VPN spoke. Hub-and-spokes
configuration with NHTB and NHTB table are described in the picture 3.4 and the table
3.1.
Figure 3.4. Hub-and-spokes topology with NHTB
Table 3.1. Routing and NHTB tables
Route Table NHTB
IP Prefix Next Hop Interface Next Hop Interface IPsec VPN Flag
10.20.10.0/24 10.1.1.2 st0.0 10.1.1.2 st0.0 VPN1 static
10.30.10.0/24 10.1.1.3 st0.0 10.1.1.3 st0.0 VPN2 static
10.40.10.0/24 10.1.1.4 st0.0 10.1.1.4 st0.0 VPN3 static
In the above example, 10.1.1.1 is the hub and other three devices are spokes. The
routing table can be populated by using a dynamic routing protocol or static routes can
be configured manually. NHTB can be populated by manually binding next-hop addresses
to the VPN tunnels or hub can automatically get the next-hop addresses from the remote
peer if both spoke and hub are Juniper devices. [39] If AutoVPN is used, manual binding
of next-hop addresses is not supported [42].
AutoVPN doesn’t support pre-shared keys, so only supported authentication method are
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X.509 certificates, which require public key infrastructure (PKI) [42].
ADVPN is Juniper’s solution for dynamical VPN tunnel creation. Base architecture is
based on a hub and spokes: all spokes are connected to the central hub with static IPsec
tunnels and spokes can communicate with each other via the hub. The tunnels between
hub and spokes can be built with earlier mentioned AutoVPN. If needed, spokes can
establish direct tunnels between each other using ADVPN. [9]
ADVPN protocol uses IKEv2 extension to transmit the required details to establish short-
cut tunnels and devices supporting ADVPN extension advertise itself with ADVPN_SUPPORTED
message in IKEv2 notify payload [9].
The shortcut establishment requires that both hub and spokes support ADVPN. Hub acts
a shortcut suggester, which means it can suggest that two spokes, which can also be
called shortcut partners, establish a direct shortcut tunnel between them. The shortcut
suggester starts the process if it notices two spokes are trying to communicate with each
other via the hub and they both have advertised being capable to ADVPN. [9]
During the shortcut exchange, the suggester sends suggestion first to one of the peers
using the existing IKEv2 SA between the suggester and the partner. If the peer accepts
exchange, the suggester starts exchange with the second peer. Shortcut exchange mes-
sages contain information which allows the peers to establish IKE and IPsec SA with
each other. [9]
The shortcut suggester selects on of the peers as initiator and second one of the peers as
responder. If neither of the peers is behind Network Address Translation (NAT), initiator
is randomly selected. If one of the peers is behind NAT, it is selected as initiator. If both
of the peers are behind NAT, shortcut cannot be established. The shortcut suggester
starts the shortcut exchange with the responder and after the responder has accepted
the suggestion, the suggester notifies the initiator. The initiator starts IKEv2 exchange
with the responder using the details it gets from the suggester and establishes a new
IPsec SA between the partners. After an IPsec SA has been successfully established,
traffic starts to flow over the shortcut tunnel. [9]
Shortcuts don’t have any pre-determined lifetime, but they are terminated if the amount
of traffic falls below a specified rate for a specified time. When shortcut is terminated,
the IKE SA and IPsec SAs are terminated, shortcut route is removed from both of the
partners and traffic between them is then routed via the hub. [9]
In addition to being locked to Juniper devices only, ADVPN can only use X.509 certificates
for authentication like AutoVPN [9]. In some cases, this can make the deployment of
ADVPN infeasible.
For internal and MPLS networks, Juniper offers Group VPN, which is a set of features
which allows using IPsec in an environment which requires multicast support or use of
shared encryption keys. Like Cisco GET VPN, it is based on GDOI. Members of the
group contact group server and authenticate themselves with IKE Phase 1 authentica-
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tion. Then, members can retrieve shared keys and group SAs from the server and start
communicating with other members via these shared SAs. If multicast is required, multi-
cast packets are replicated in the core network like any other cleartext multicast packets
but they are encrypted with a shared key. [33]
As both of Cisco and Juniper use the GDOI in their VPN solutions, they both share a
limitation: GDOI doesn’t encapsulate source and destination IP addresses. This means
that the internal IP network addressing is exposed, but usually this is not an issue, as
Group VPN should only be used in internal or MPLS network. [5]
Juniper has two versions of the Group VPN: v1 and v2. V1 is based on the GDOI defined
in RFC 3547 and v2 is based on the updated version of GDOI defined in RFC 6407 [33,
34]. They are interoperable with some limitations, but v2 is only supported by the current
generation of Juniper devices [33, 34]. V1 has some proprietary limitations so it might not
fully work with GDOI implementations of other vendors, but v2 is fully compliant with the
newer version of GDOI and Juniper states it interoperates with other RFC 6407 compliant
devices [34].
Juniper’s remote access VPN solution is different compared to some other remote access
VPN solutions in the market. Unlike many others, Juniper doesn’t have a SSL VPN
available at all and they don’t offer their own VPN client. Client, called NCP Remote
Access Client, is provided by their partner NCP engineering GmbH and in addition to a
Juniper SRX series device, the VPN solution requires a NCP Exclusive Remote Access
Management server [77].
Remote access VPN supports IKEv1 and IKEv2. If the client is behind a firewall which
blocks IKE traffic (UDP port 500) and prevents traffic required for setting up an IPsec
tunnel, VPN endpoint and client can encapsulate the traffic and use TCP port 443 for the
traffic. NCP calls this technology NCP Path Finder and they have versions 1 and 2 of
it. Version 1 encapsulates the IPsec messages within a TCP connection over port 443.
Version 2 encapsulates the messages within a SSL/TLS connection. Version 2 is used if
it is supported and configured and if the client can’t establish the connection with version
1. [77]
3.1.3 Pulse Secure
Pulse Secure is an American cybersecurity company which was born in 2015 when Ju-
niper Networks sold Junos Pulse product line to Siris Capital [45]. Their products are
mostly concentrated on securing remote access and the Pulse Connect Secure VPN is
one part of that portfolio.
Pulse Connect supports both client and clientless modes and the client application is
available to all major mobile and desktop operating systems. For securing the traffic
it can use either TLS or IPsec with IKEv2 and both IPv4 and IPv6 are supported [74,
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75]. As Pulse Secure is not building firewall devices, Pulse Connect server is always a
dedicated VPN gateway device or virtualized appliance.
3.1.4 Checkpoint
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. is a cybersecurity company from Israel. Check
Point develops and sells software and hardware products for network, endpoint, cloud
and mobile security. Their networking devices support normal IPsec for site-to-site VPN
use cases and solution for remote access usage.
Check Point IPsec implementation has a feature called VPN Communities to ease the
deployment of full mesh and star (hub and spoke) topologies [83]. To use VPN Com-
munities, all participating devices need to have PSK or certificates as they are required
for authentication before VPNs can be created and all devices need to be connected to
Check Point Security Management Server. When all participating devices are connected
to the management server, adding new peers to a new or existing IPsec star or mesh
topology is relatively easy. [11, 82]
Remote access VPN of Check Point is like many others. It can use TLS or IPsec for
encrypting the traffic, it supports both client and clientless modes and clients are available
to all major operating systems [10]. VPN connections are terminated on Check Point
firewalls but using the feature requires separate license.
3.1.5 Fortinet
Fortinet is a multinational company which headquarters are in California. They develop
cybersecurity software, devices and services. Their FortiGate firewalls support normal
IPsec, Fortinet proprietary remote access VPN, Overlay Controller VPN (OCVPN) and
Auto Discovery VPN (ADVPN) which is similar to Juniper’s ADVPN but not compatible
with it.
OCVPN uses Fortinet cloud to simplify configuration of a VPN. Devices require license
to use this feature and they must to have public IPs when they connect to the cloud.
Only configuration OCVPN needs is the list of subnets which should be shared with the
OCVPN participants and that OCVPN is enabled on all participants. After those have
been configured, OCVPN firewalls send the data to the cloud and required configuration
is generated in the cloud [27]. OCVPN can create single tunnel between two devices or
if there are more than two participants, it can create full mesh topology or a hub-spoke
topology with ADVPN shortcuts [27, 28].
ADVPN works similar to Juniper’s ADVPN which was described in section 3.1.2. Hub(s),
spokes and tunnels between them are configured manually or with the OCVPN. If spoke
needs to send traffic to another spoke, it is routed through hub(s) to the receiving spoke.
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When hub notices that both source and destination tunnels have auto-discovery enabled,
it sends a message via IKE to the source and inform it should try to negotiate a direct
tunnel for the traffic. [43]
The source spoke then sends a FortiOS-specific IKE INFORMATIONAL SHORTCUT-
QUERY with public IP of the spoke, the source address of the traffic, the destination
address of the traffic and the PSK towards the destination spoke via the hub(s). When the
destination spoke receives the message, it replies with IKE INFORMATIONAL message
containing the public IP of itself. [25]
When the source spoke has received the public IP of the destination spoke, it creates
a new dynamic tunnel between the spokes and starts IKE negotiation. After successful
tunnel creation routing is updated by the routing protocol (RIP, BGP or OSPF) traffic starts
to flow via the shortcut. [25]
Remote access VPN is like many others. It supports both IPsec and SSL, client and
clientless mode and FortiClient client software is available to all major operating systems.
3.1.6 Palo Alto Networks
Palo Alto Networks, Inc. is multinational cybersecurity company which has headquarters
in California. The core of their product portfolio consists of next-generation firewalls and
cloud-based cybersecurity services and products. Their firewalls support three different
VPN solutions: basic IPsec for site-to-site connections, GlobalProtect VPN for remote
access and GlobalProtect Large Scale VPN (LSVPN) for deploying a scalable hub and
spoke solution [69].
The idea behind LSVPN is to simplify the deployment of a hub and multiple spokes, which
are also called remote satellites, for enterprises. LSVPN requires Palo Alto firewalls to
hub and each spokes but according to Palo Alto, the amount of required configuration is
minimal. [68]
LSVPN uses certificates for authenticating the devices, SSL to encrypt the control and
configuration communications a between hub and spokes and IPsec to encrypt the ex-
changed traffic between hub and spokes [69]. LSVPN supports both IPv4 and IPv6 pro-
tocols and static and dynamic routing. LSVPN deployment has three core components:
GlobalProtect Portal, Gateway(s) and Satellite(s).
 Portal is the management component of the LSVPN infrastructure. Every spoke
device connects to portal and downloads required configuration files to connect to
the hub(s). [68]
 Gateway (a hub) acts as a tunnel endpoint for the satellite (spoke) connections.
Portal and Gateway can be running a same Palo Alto firewall. [68]
 Satellite (spoke) is a firewall device on remote site that connect to the gateway
with credentials and configurations downloaded from the portal. As configuration is
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downloaded from portal, each new satellite requires very small amount of configu-
ration before deploying. [68]
GlobalProtect VPN is Palo Alto’s proprietary solution for remote access VPN. All of their
firewalls support it but using it requires separate subscription. GlobalProtect has client
software for all major mobile and desktop operating systems [67] and it also supports
clientless mode for providing secure remote access to supported enterprise web applica-
tions [70]. Clientless mode uses SSL to encrypt the traffic.
In client mode, GlobalProtect supports both IPsec and SSL VPN based connections.
IPsec is a preferred method as it has better performance than the SSL [109].
3.2 Open source solutions
The market of open source VPN solutions is dominated by two protocols: OpenVPN and
IPsec. IPsec is usually used for site-to-site connections and the implementations should
be compatible with commercial solutions. OpenVPN is an open source alternative for all
commercial SSL VPNs and like commercial products, it has its own proprietary protocol.
3.2.1 OpenVPN
OpenVPN is open source VPN software which has been available since 2001. The orig-
inal version was written by James Yonan and later he founded OpenVPN Inc. which has
continued the development work since that. The community edition of OpenVPN is still
free and open source but OpenVPN Inc. also sells a product called OpenVPN Access
Server for business customers. Both community and commercial versions use the same
OpenVPN protocol and offer the same core functionalities, but commercial version has
some additional features like a web portal for administration, support for additional au-
thentication methods like Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory, easier
installation and more options for access control [63]. OpenVPN can be considered as
an industry standard in the market of open source VPN software as it is the most widely
used open source VPN solution. Its status is so strong that IANA has given it an official
assigned port 1194, which is the default port of the current releases.
OpenVPN is a SSL/TLS VPN solution which can be used as remote access and site-to-
site VPN. It has own protocol, so it is not compatible with other open source or commercial
solutions. It can use both UDP and TCP protocols and IPv4 and IPv6. OpenVPN supports
two kinds of network adapters via the TUN/TAP driver: when using TUN, it creates layer
3 tunnel for IP traffic and with TAP it creates layer 2 tunnel for carrying Ethernet traffic. All
encryption and authentication tasks are handled by open source OpenSSL and PolarSSL
libraries which both are actively developed and patched. [65]
For authentication OpenVPN has two modes: static keys and TLS. If static keys are
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used, both peers have static keys which contain four separate keys: HMAC send, HMAC
receive, encryption and decryption keys. In TLS mode, peers establish a SSL session
and authenticate to each other with certificates. After successful authentication, both
peers randomly generate encryption/decryption key and HMAC key source material and
exchange it over the established SSL session. After the exchange, both peers have
required keys to start exchanging encrypted traffic. [64]
Figure 3.5. OpenVPN multiplex model
As SSL/TLS requires reliable transport, so OpenVPN has to offer a reliable transport
to it even when using UDP with a separate reliability layer. OpenVPN multiplexes the
SSL/TLS session and the encrypted packets to a single data stream, but only SSL/TLS
session uses the reliability layer as the encrypted data stream doesn’t require it. The
multiplexing model is illustrated in the picture 3.5. [64]
Like many other VPN solutions, OpenVPN supports multiple platforms including Linux,
Windows, OSX and mobile operating systems and it can be ported to any platform with
relatively small effort as it has been created as a user-space daemon instead of a kernel
module, encryption is handled by open source libraries and the architecture is modular.
Being a user-space daemon also makes it more secure in the OS side than kernel imple-
mentations like IPsec as it can’t access the most critical parts of the OS [36]. OpenVPN
is also supported by open source firewall distributions like pfSense and VyOS.
3.2.2 IPsec
IPsec software is available for most of the operating systems in one or multiple forms.
Most which are in active development implement the required standards mentioned in
IPsec RFCs as defined in them.
For Linux distributions strongSwan and Libreswan are probably the most widely used
software implementations. They are both descendants of the FreeS/WAN project which
ended in 2004 and was forked to Openswan and strongSwan projects. Openswan was
later forked to Libreswan. Both of them fully support IPsec but Libreswan has worse
support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and it can’t be deployed in to a high
available cluster unlike strongSwan [54, 94, 95].
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FreeBSD and OpenBSD are supported by strongSwan but they also have their own IPsec
implementation based on the KAME project [94, 97]. BSD based firewalls like pfSense
and VyOS therefore have native IPsec support [16, 102]. VyOS also has their own imple-
mentation of Cisco’s DMVPN described in section 3.1.1 and it is compatible with it Cisco’s
implementation [103].
3.3 Comparison
Based on the data collected in 3, it is clear that IPsec is the industry standard solution
for site-to-site VPN tunnels. All commercial and open source products are supporting it
and in most cases they fulfill the standards described in RFCs related to IPsec. Most
of the large vendors have proprietary solutions of some kind for the deployment and
configuration of site-to-site VPN tunnels which are not compatible with the products of
other vendors but they all use IPsec for securing the traffic.
Even though IPsec can be considered as standard, the implementations and supported
features differ more or less between the vendors and this can cause issues when tunnels
are being built. This has happened because IPsec standard has large amount of options
and flexibility [26]. Comparison of the IPsec implementations between multiple vendors
is difficult and there aren’t any mandatory certification processes to verify that vendor
has implemented IPsec properly. Earlier there was a Virtual Private Network Consortium
(VPNC) which did testing and tried to increase the interoperability but the consortium
ended in 2015 [101]. Only company which is doing certifications of some kind for IPsec
implementation today is ICSA Labs but getting certification from them is optional so there
are currently very few IPsec certified devices in their list [40].
The proprietary solutions of vendors try to solve the complexity of deployment but most of
them have limitations of some kind, they get complex to manage in large deployments and
users are locked in to a single vendor when they are using those solutions. A comparison
of proprietary IPsec based VPNs is shown in the table 3.2.
The above table is a simplification of the features as it only shows the interpreted goals
of each solution. From table and earlier descriptions of each technology it is easy to
see that most of all examined vendors have tried to develop technologies which would
help deploying IPsec to large environments in basic hub-and-spoke manner and three
out of five of them have also developed way to deploy full mesh with dynamic shortcuts
without configuring everything manually. It is easy to understand why these have been
the goals: IPsec is complicated and deploying even a single tunnel manually can be a
time consuming task so it is not easy to deploy or maintain large environment.
Vendors have been able to ease the deployment and maintenance with these technolo-
gies but they don’t solve the issues of IPsec completely as they only work if all devices
come from the same vendor. Therefore, their usability in real world is limited because
they often cannot be utilized when tunnels between different organizations are built as
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Table 3.2. Comparison of proprietary VPN solutions
Product Tunnelless Full mesh Dynamicshortcuts
Easier
provisioning
Cisco DMVPN X X X
Cisco FlexVPN X X X
Cisco GETVPN X
Cisco Easy VPN X
Juniper AutoVPN X
Juniper ADVPN X X
Juniper Group VPN X
Check Point Communities X X
Fortinet OCVPN X X
Fortinet ADVPN X X
Palo Alto LSVPN X
devices are not always from the same vendor. IPsec implementations of cloud vendors
like Amazon or Microsoft are neither compatible with these proprietary solutions, so if
organization wants to connect cloud infrastructure to their network with proprietary VPN
technology they need to install a virtual appliance in cloud and let it handle the VPN
instead of using managed VPN endpoint service [17, 104].
Remote access VPNs are today a big part of offering for each cybersecurity/networking
company who sells them because users need to be able to reach resources in internal
networks securely from home and other remote locations. None of the companies or
open source projects have created completely new protocol for VPNs but they all rely
on SSL/TLS and/or IPsec even though they are not compatible with each other. All of
the available remote access VPN solutions have been available so long that the core
features are almost identical in practice. Therefore vendors have started to develop more
advanced extras like better centralized management, single sign-on (SSO), always-on
VPN and 3rd party integrations to keep up with the competition and to distinguish from
the competitors [12, 67, 75].
From all of these examined solutions, OpenVPN stands out for two reasons: it is the
only open-source SSL VPN available and compared to the commercial SSL VPNs it is
unique as it can be used also for site-to-site connections. Even though OpenVPN can be
used for site-to-site connections it has not even properly challenged IPsec in enterprise
environments because IPsec is supported by all enterprise networking devices unlike
OpenVPN and it still offers better performance than OpenVPN [50, 52].
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4 FUTURE
The need for remote access and interconnecting remote locations to each other over the
Internet is not decreasing in the future, so VPNs and other solutions which secure the
traffic and endpoints will be needed more and more. However, the transition to cloud
services from local infrastructure, new technologies and new concepts can disrupt the
position of traditional remote access VPNs and IPsec.
4.1 SoftEther
SoftEther is open source VPN software which is an academic project from University of
Tsukuba. SoftEther was developed as a part of Daiyuu Nobori’s master thesis research
in the university and in 2014 it was released as open source. Even though SoftEther was
released several years ago, it seems it is not widely used outside of Asia, as there are
very few research papers or other written resources in English.
Original SoftEther 1.0 was only a simple layer 2 VPN software which was developed
by Nobori as a personal project to bypass the firewalls of university. SoftEther 1.0 was
released in 2003 as freeware and Government of Japan also got interested about it: they
thought it is a danger to computer security and commercial VPN solutions and therefore
demanded Nobori to stop sharing it to public. Nobori didn’t agree with the government
but he had to stop sharing it as otherwise he could have lost his place in the University of
Tsukuba. [3]
In 2004, Nobori and Mitsubishi Materials Corporation made a 10-year agreement of sell-
ing the SoftEther 1.0 as a commercial VPN product of Mitsubishi. During the 10-year
agreement, Nobori wasn’t allowed to sell the SoftEther 1.0 to customers directly, but he
was allowed to keep developing it and share it as freeware or open source. The current
"SoftEther VPN", which is a completely different product than the original SoftEther 1.0, is
the result of that development. Binaries of the SoftEther VPN were released in 2013 and
in 2014 it became open source under GPLv2 license and in 2019 license was switched
to Apache License 2.0. [19, 84, 105]
Like mentioned earlier, original SoftEther 1.0 only supported its own ethernet over HTTPS
protocol for VPN, but when Nobori found out there isn’t a VPN server available which
would support multiple available VPN protocols, he started to develop the current version
of the SoftEther VPN server. Currently, SoftEther VPN supports SoftEther, IPsec, SSTP
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and OpenVPN protocols and all of the protocols can be used simultaneously which makes
SoftEther unique server software. [62, 106]
Key technology behind SoftEther is the virtualization of ethernet. By using virtualized
ethernet on layer 2, SoftEther is not limited to tunneling IP traffic and performance is
also better than with VPN solutions encapsulating IP packets. SoftEther creates a virtual
ethernet adapter to the client device and a virtual ethernet switch (called Virtual Hub)
to the VPN server. These two virtualized components are connected to each other via
a VPN session which is like a virtualized ethernet cable. Sessions uses TCP or UDP
connections and they are encrypted with SSL encryption. [106]
Even though virtual hubs are called hubs, they work as physical ethernet switches instead
of hubs: ethernet frames are exchanged between each connected VPN session accord-
ing to the data in the forwarding database (FDB). Virtual hubs can be connected to physi-
cal ethernet interfaces of the VPN server via local bridges. This allows the VPN server to
be connected to physical infrastructure and allows remote users to access resources run-
ning on physical infrastructure. Virtual hubs are used for all protocols SoftEther supports.
[106]
If required, hubs can be interconnected with a cascading connection, which is like a
virtualized ethernet cable between two switches. Cascading allows, for example, inter-
connection between multiple sites and then users and computers connected to each site
can reach the resources of other sites. [106]
Figure 4.1. SoftEther topology with cascading connection between office and data center
Internally SoftEther server handles all VPN protocols on layer 2 even though OpenVPN,
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SSTP and IPsec use layer 3 for tunneling the traffic. SoftEther decrypts the arriving IP-
packets and forwards them to a separate L2 <-> L3 converter which encapsulates the
decrypted IP-packets to Ethernet frames. Ethernet frames are then sent to the hub and
as the converter has unique IP- and MAC-address for each terminated VPN tunnel, the
virtual hub is able to handle the incoming and outgoing traffic of the tunnel like all other
native SoftEther traffic. [106]
The feature set of SoftEther is comparable to other open source and also commercial
VPN products. It uses modern encryption algorithms to encrypt the traffic (AES-256 and
4098 bit RSA), it can bypass firewalls and NATs, it has sufficient logging capabilities, it
supports RADIUS authentication and server and client software are available to all mod-
ern operating systems [106]. The firewall bypassing capabilities are somewhat unique:
SoftEther can encapsulate VPN packets to ICMP or DNS packets. This feature enables
SoftEther to be used in restricted networks which only permit ICMP (Internet Control
Message Protocol) or DNS (Domain Name System) packets to be sent. [85]
4.2 WireGuard
WireGuard is a completely new point-to-point open source VPN application which uses
state-of-the-art cryptography algorithms. WireGuard is not based on any old solution or
protocol as it uses own protocol. According to the developers, WireGuard’s goal is to be
faster, simpler and more useful than old VPN solutions like IPsec and OpenVPN. As it is
lightweight and fast, it can also be run on embedded and mobile devices. There isn’t yet a
stable release of the software but development is continuing and developers are working
towards stable 1.0 release. [23]
The linux version of WireGuard has been created as a kernel module because the goal
was to create fast and simple VPN solution which would be able to compete with IPsec
in speed, could be run on slower hardware like mobile devices and would be easy to
use, maintain and audit. Developers argue that these things have been achieved as
performance is comparable to IPsec, implementation has less than 4000 lines of code so
it is easy to audit and it is easy to use as WireGuard just creates virtual interfaces and
integrates with native Linux tools like ip and ifconfig. [2]
As WireGuard aims to be easy to use, the authentication mechanism uses simple public
and private keys for authentication. Mechanism resembles SSH closely as both server
and client have public and private keys and only those need to be exchanged a before
connection can be established. After a connection has been established with the help of
public keys, key exchanges, connections, reconnects and disconnects are automatically
handled by WireGuard. [2, 23]
Like IPsec and SSL VPNs, WireGuard operates on layer 3 so it can only be used for
transmitting IP traffic. The authors of WireGuard argue that layer 3 is the correct way
for bridging IP networks and that this approach is the cleaners for ensuring authenticity
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and attributability of the transmitted packets. It supports both IPv4 and IPv6 and can also
encapsulate IPv4 to IPv6 and vice versa. [2]
Figure 4.2. Overview of handshake process in WireGuard when cookie is not used
Figure 4.3. Overview of handshake process in WireGuard when cookie is used
Before any encrypted data can be sent, a handshake has to happen. In the handshake
process, the initiator sends a handshake initiation message to the responder and the
responder replies with a handshake response. Handshake messages are always au-
thenticated with the public keys. After handshake messages have been exchanged, both
peers compute the encryption keys and they can start transmitting encrypted data to each
other. Handshake workflows with and without cookies are illustrated in pictures 4.2 and
4.3. [2]
WireGuard creates a simple virtual interface to the operating system. The interface as-
sociates tunnel IP address with the public key and the remote endpoint of the tunnel. If
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the interface tries to send a packet to the remote destination, workflow is following:
 Destination of the packet is 192.168.10.10.
 Address 192.168.10.10 is associated with peer ABCD
 Encrypt a packet with the public key of ABCD
 Send an encrypted packet to the peer’s remote endpoint which address is 107.107.107.107
and UDP port is 53500.
 Peer ABCD receives a packet to 107.107.107.107:53500.
 The packet is decrypted with private key of the ABCD. The packet reveals it came
from the peer EFGH and its current remote endpoint is 108.108.108.108:54500.
 Contents of the packet tell it came from 192.168.20.20. If configuration allows the
interface to receive packets from EFGH from 192.168.20.20 it is accepted.
Creators of WireGuard call the above described process Cryptokey Routing. Cryptokey
Routing is based on associating public keys with allowed IP addresses inside the tunnel.
Each network interface has public and private keys and its own configuration. The con-
figuration contains the private key of the interface, the public keys of the configured peers
and their allowed IP addresses inside the tunnel. [2, 23]
When a client wants to send a packet, for example to 192.168.10.10, it uses the configu-
ration as a routing table and searches for the destination address from the configuration
and if the address is found, it uses the configured public key to encrypt the packet and
sends it to the configured remote peer. On the server side, in other words on the receiving
end of the tunnel, the list of allowed IPs works as an access control list: if a packet arrives
from an IP which is not in the list of allowed, it is dropped. According to the developers,
Cryptokey Routing eliminates the need for complicated firewalling as packets are only
allowed to arrive from pre-defined and authenticated peers. [23]
From user perspective WireGuard seems to be like stateless. When the peer and the
server have been configured properly, the client can start sending packets to the server
immediately as WireGuard handles establishing the connection transparently. It also al-
lows peers to roam from network to network as there aren’t any active sessions or states
to upkeep and peers keep updating the server with their current remote IP address. [23]
WireGuard doesn’t utilize AES, 3DES or other widely used ciphers and protocols like
IPsec and various SSL VPNs do. Instead of them, WireGuard is using other, newer avail-
able alternatives which have also been analyzed at level they can be considered secure.
For initial key exchange, it uses Noise, encryption keys are computed with Curve25519
function, ChaCha20 with Poly1305 is used for authenticated symmetric encryption and
BLAKE2s is used for hashing [2]. These protocols and ciphers have been selected be-
cause they offer better performance than the older alternatives. For example, ChaCha20
offers about 3 times better performance than AES if encryption is executed on platforms
lacking specialized AES hardware [61].
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Computing encryption keys with Curve25519 is CPU intensive so a denial of service
attack would be possible if there wasn’t any protection against it. WireGuard uses a
cookie system to solve this potential security issue. If the receiving end of the package is
under heavy CPU load, it can discard the incoming package and reply to the sender with
a cookie reply containing a cookie. The sender can then re-transmit the package which
was rejected with the cookie and get it accepted. The handshake process with cookie is
shown in the picture 4.3 but cookies can also be utilized similar way with encrypted data
packages. [2]
4.3 SDN and SD-WAN
Networking devices operate on three different planes:
 Management plane is used by the tools which are used to configure and manage
the device. Usually, devices have graphical user interface and/or command line
interface.
 Control plane controls the logic behind routing decisions.
 Data plane is responsible for transmitting the data packets according to the forward-
ing tables.
In traditional networking, management, control and data planes are on the same device
which means that devices are specialized, complicated, expensive and each device has
to be managed one by one. Software Defined Networking (SDN), which has been one
of the hottest topics in last few years in networking, allows these planes to be separated
from each other. When these three layers are separated from each other, control and
management can be centralized which allows centralized management of multiple simple
data plane devices. [32] SDN architecture is illustrated in the figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4. SDN architecture
Centralized management makes the configuration and management of the network eas-
ier and increases the network performance because the controller has visibility to the
whole network and therefore it can make better routing decisions and utilize QoS more
efficiently. Centralized management of data plane devices is done by controller software.
The crucial components of SDN architecture are northbound and southbound APIs. North-
bound is the API between management and control planes and it can be used to monitor
the traffic and control the controller software which allows the manipulation of traffic in
the network. Southbound API is between control and data planes and controller soft-
ware uses it to control the data plane devices. [32] The most widely utilized southbound
protocol is an open standard called OpenFlow but networking vendors also have their
proprietary solutions.
There are multiple controller software available. Most networking vendors who are selling
SDN solutions have their own proprietary controllers but there are also multiple open
source options available like ONOS, OpenDayLight and FloodLight.
Together with the rise of SDN, Software DefinedWide Are Networking (SD-WAN) concept
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has developed and increased its popularity. SD-WAN can thought as an extension of
SDN, as SDN concept was originally designed and implemented into local area networks
and SD-WAN spreads it to wide area networks. SD-WAN can be seen as replacement
for old MPLS and traditional IPsec architectures as the centralized control makes the
configuration and management significantly easier and faster. IPsec itself is still required
with SDN and SD-WAN as they are not going to take away the need for encryption. In
fact, encryption is required even more than before as SD-WAN relies on public Internet
unlike private MPLS connections. It seems there aren’t any new competitors to IPsec, so
it is going to stay the most widely utilized encryption solutions.
Many of the large networking companies have their own SD-WAN solutions and there are
also some completely new companies in the market as the market has significant growth
potential. SD-WAN makes deployment and management of large networks with IPsec
easier because the controller manages both ends of the tunnel, so SD-WAN solutions
can replace the proprietary solutions like DMVPN and ADVPN which aimed to ease the
configuration and management of IPsec. Compared to these old proprietary solutions,
SD-WAN offers better compatibility and performance with cloud resources as traffic to-
wards cloud can be routed directly to cloud, better scalability and better performance
overall because controller can handle QoS better than traditional networking devices.
4.4 SDP
Software Defined Perimeter (SPD) is a relatively new concept which was published in
2013 by Software Defined Perimeter working group. The goal of the research group was
to make a comprehensive and cost effective solutions for defeating attacks and securing
users, cloud services and on-premises infrastructure. To achieve this all, they had three
key elements for the design. [88]
 Identities of the users and devices must be verified before they can access the
resources.
 Cryptographic verification is used to ensure that security model is followed.
 Protocols which are used must be proven public domain security controls.
SDP architecture consists of three components: SDP Client, SDP Controller and SDP
Gateway. All components are shown in the figure 4.5. The both control and data connec-
tions of SDP are protected by TLS encryption. [88]
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Figure 4.5. SDP architecture
The client initiates a session by connecting to the controller and attempts to authenticate
the user and device. After a successful authentication, the controller verifies the client
and devices are authorized to access the service they are trying to reach. If the client
is authorized, the controller configures the gateway to accept connections from the client
and configures the client to connect to the gateway. When the client is connecting, the
gateway uses client’s certificate and IP address to verify its identity and if they match
those which controller provided, connection the requested resource is allowed. [88]
According to the research group, SDP has several unique security properties [88]:
 Only visible component of the architecture is the controller as none of the gateways
or applications respond to anything which isn’t authorized. This hides the complete
application infrastructure.
 Pre-authentication and pre-authorization ensure that TCP connection between ap-
plication and client is only initiated if client is allowed to access the application.
 Clients only have application level access and no network layer access.
Even though SDP concept is relatively new, there are already commercial solutions avail-
able from multiple vendors like Pulse Secure, Cato Networks and perimeter 81 [86, 87,
89]. As SDP has potential to be future solution, there will probably be even more compe-
tition in the market in the future.
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5 DISCUSSION
This thesis examined the currently available commercial and open source VPN solutions
and also some potential future technologies. The results of current situation are clear:
IPsec is still industry standard solution for site-to-site connections and SSL/TLS is the
most common technology utilized in remote access VPNs. They have almost completely
replaced older technologies like PPTP and L2TP.
IPsec has so strong position that there are no real alternatives to it in most enterprise
environments. This is interesting because IPsec is a relatively old standard, nothing
revolutionary has been implemented into it in recent years and it has been criticized
since the day one for being too complex, complicated and insecure [26]. None of those
issues have been fixed but it is hard to see that IPsec would disappear anywhere in the
near future.
OpenVPN has a strong position in the remote access VPN market and it is clearly the
market leader of open source solutions. At least originally developers planned it would
be a competitor to IPsec in site-to-site connections but that hasn’t happened at least
in the enterprise networks even though OpenVPN has almost as good performance as
IPsec and it can be easier to manage than IPsec. The reason for that OpenVPN has
not became more common in site-to-site connections is probably the fact that very few
enterprise networking devices support it, so it is not an option for most of the enterprises.
Still, OpenVPN has a really strong position in the enterprise and also in the consumer
market as many of the commercial VPN providers use OpenVPN as their protocol.
From the new but traditional solutions, Wireguard looks more promising and interesting
as SoftEther doesn’t offer anything new except it supports multiple VPN technologies.
SoftEther can be a good solution for environments where it can replace multiple VPN
endpoints which utilize different technologies but it probably won’t replace any other so-
lutions in a large scale.
Wireguard has potential because it is modern new solution with new architecture and
protocols and even though it is not ready yet, the results are promising. It is a lot more
simple than IPsec and also easier to deploy and manage but it can still offer good security
and performance. However, there aren’t any research papers with performance measure-
ments except the whitepaper of the Wireguard developer so the real performance has not
been tested very well yet. Security of Wireguard is also still a question even though the
protocol has been audited to be secure, but code itself has not been audited yet as it is
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still under development [23]. If code gets properly audited successfully and networking
equipment start to support it or it gets a SDN compatible implementation, it might have a
chance to become a real alternative to IPsec.
All of the above mentioned old and new solutions still share the same issues more or
less: they all or just tunnels between two points so creating and managing a more com-
plicated topology, like mesh, still requires quite large amount of work. The proprietary
solutions like Cisco DMVPN and Juniper ADVPN and AutoVPN tried to ease the configu-
ration and management but because they are proprietary and still somewhat clumsy, they
haven’t became very common. SDN solutions are the first ones which are really making
the centralized management of networking infrastructure possible and therefore configu-
ration and management of complex infrastructure can become easier. SDN architecture
is neither completely proprietary like DMVPN and others, even though vendors also have
proprietary solutions, and there are open protocols like OpenFlow which are supported
by multiple vendors, which can make it more attractive. SDN is also more compatible with
cloud services than traditional solutions. If SDN usage keeps increasing like it has done,
the SDN solutions can completely supersede the old proprietary solutions like DMVPN.
The ever increasing usage of cloud based infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as
a service (PaaS) and software as a service (SaaS) services introduces new possibilities
and also risks to the organizations which can be hard to handle with old solutions. For
example, many cloud based services are available to public internet and their access
control relies on user authentication, so VPNs don’t offer any additional security to them.
Even if cloud based service is protected by access control lists which only allow access
through VPN, architecture is still heavily relying to the authentication of user who probably
uses username, password and sometimes multi-factor authentication. Routing traffic to
cloud through a centralized VPN server is also questionable performance wise.
The changed requirements of cloud based environments give chance to new innovations
and approaches to the security issues. The SDP model is a great and promising ex-
ample of that: it offers end-to-end encryption like traditional SSL/TLS VPN but without
centralized VPN endpoint which makes it cloud compatible. It also offers additional inte-
grated security features which traditional VPN solutions don’t have: it hides the network
completely from the outside attacker, strengthens the user and device authentication and
limits possible exposure as users have only application level access to single applications
instead of network level access to the infrastructure.
SDP solutions are also easier to maintain and manage to organizations as they are sold
as SaaS service instead of appliances. When using SaaS service, organizations don’t
need to maintain the remote access solution by themselves and it is also scalable unlike
traditional appliances.
Gartner did an analysis of SDP in 2018 and their message was that technical profession-
als should explore SDP as it matches the dynamic requirements of software defined data
centers and clouds [44]. SDP solutions have a chance to gain significant share of the re-
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mote access market in the near future and replace traditional SSL/TLS VPNs. Especially
companies which need to replace their current remote access solution in the near future
might consider moving to SDP solution.
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6 CONCLUSION
Virtual private networks have been utilized in information technology over 20 years and
they are also needed in the future. During the over 20 years long period there have been
relatively few technologies which would have been widely utilized. Standard IPsec and
various SSL/TLS based are currently the two most widely used technologies in the VPNs
deployed and they have been the most common choices for years. Nothing has replaced
either of them as they have been good enough for data center environments.
The increasing usage of hybrid and cloud environments has changed the requirements
for secure connectivity. Standard site-to-site IPsec and SSL/TLS based remote access
VPNs are not very well suited for these new requirements. Standard IPsec is not scal-
able enough to large cloud environments and remote access VPNs which route all traffic
through a data center are not optimal for using resources in multiple clouds.
SDN, SD-WAN and SDP answer these requirements with new features. SDN resolves
some of the issues of IPsec by managing both ends of the tunnels which makes the con-
figuration and management easier. SDP offers a completely new approach to the remote
access which works well with cloud. Both SDN and SDP architectures are relatively new,
but solutions based on them are already available from multiple vendors. It is highly likely
that they are the future and their usage will increase fast in the near future.
Does IPsec have a future and will it be replaced with something new in the near future
were two of the primary questions of this thesis. Answers are quite clear. IPsec has a
future as it will still be used in the SDN networks. Wireguard might have a chance to be
an altenative to IPsec but it probably won’t replace IPsec in a large scale, at least not very
soon.
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